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Abstract 
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision 
of environmental services based on agricultural foregone income.  This creates a potential 
incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm 
land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the scheme.  However, the 
Higher Level Scheme (HLS) design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse 
selection.  This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal 
agent framework at the regional level.  It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of 
more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has led to a greater 
overall contracted area (and thus potential environmental benefit) which has had the effect of 
reducing the adverse selection problem.  In addition, for landscape regions with the same 
payment rate (i.e. of the same agricultural value), differential weighting of the public demand 
for environmental goods and services provided by agriculture (measured by weighting an 
environmental benefit function by the distance to main cities) appears to be reflected into the 
regulator’s allocation of contracts, thereby also reducing the adverse selection problem. 
Keywords and JEL codes 
Adverse selection, agri-environment, Environmental Stewardship, principal-agent, 
contract 
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1. Introduction 
From 1992, the European Common Agricultural Policy’s successive reforms have 
shifted away from production support by including a parallel agri-environmental policy based 
on the idea of the multifunctionality of agriculture.  This agri-environmental policy provides 
payments to farmers for providing environmental goods and services.  The main agri-
environmental scheme in England since 2005 has been the Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme, which builds up from cross compliance requirements (the baseline for paid 
environmental service provision) (Defra, 2005a).  It is a nationally-set two-tiered scheme, 
corresponding to two levels of increasing environmental commitment: the ELS/OELS (Entry 
Level Scheme/Organic Entry Level Scheme) tier with a broader approach (and higher 
participation), and the HLS (Higher Level Scheme) tier with a more focused approach and 
higher level of environmental commitment (with limited entry).  The ELS tier (along with the 
OELS, its equivalent for organic agriculture) is based on a whole-farm approach and opened 
to all farmers and landowners, within 5-year contracts (Defra, 2005a).  It is relies on self-
selection by farmers of environmental options within a given ‘menu’, each option 
corresponding to a given number of points reflecting on the agricultural income foregone 
(nationally estimated) (Defra, 2005a).  ELS (OELS) agreements are guaranteed providing 
farmers meet a 30-point (60-point) target per hectare for a corresponding payment of £30/ha 
(£60/ha) (Defra, 2005a).  The second tier or Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) corresponds to 
a higher level of environmental commitment than ELS or OELS and targets more complex 
types of management and capital work plans (Defra, 2005a, 2005b).  Farmers still self-select 
land management options within a set ‘menu’, but entry is discretionary with applications 
competitively selected by Natural England by a scoring and threshold mechanism derived 
from the previous Countryside Stewardship scheme, assessing the environmental value 
provided (Defra, 2005a, 2005b). Scoring of applications is spatially differentiated, based on 
159 Joint Character Areas i.e. areas of the English countryside with similar landscape 
character, each with a specific association of wildlife and natural features (Defra, 2005b).  
Each Joint Character Area has a corresponding set of environmental key and secondary 
targets (detailed in specific ‘targeting statements’) for the management of a variety of 
features, against which farm applications are scored, with priority given to Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSIs) and Scheduled Monuments (Defra, 2005b). 
 
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme aims at delivering environmental benefits, but 
is based on incentive payments typically calculated as an average of the agricultural income 
foregone by farmers (or ‘opportunity cost’, OC) and not as the environmental benefit derived 
from the land entered into the scheme.  Since agricultural income and environmental benefit 
are not necessarily (spatially) correlated (OECD, 2004, Fraser, 2009), the discrepancy 
between farmer incentives to enter the Environmental Stewardship Scheme based on their 
individual OC of agricultural production and the government agencies’ (Defra and Natural 
England) objective of paying farmers for an environmental benefit potentially leads to an 
incentive-compatibility problem (Fraser and Fraser, 2006).  In combination with information 
asymmetries regarding farmer’s OC of environmental service provision and land quality, this 
incentive incompatibility can lead to adverse selection of farmers for entry into the schemes.  
From the payment set up, the increased potential for adverse selection into the scheme would 
be expressed as the lowest agricultural quality land entered into the scheme by farmers rather 
than the highest environmental quality land as targeted by the government.  The quasi-market 
payment for agri-environment provision is thus unlikely to be optimal (compared to a full 
information situation), and the combination of incentive incompatibilities and information 
asymmetries is likely to lead to systematic misallocation of taxpayer funding, both within and 
between landscape regions (Fraser, 2009). 
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Although all Environmental Stewardship tiers are likely to be subject to the incentive-
compatibility problem, this problem is potentially reduced in the case of the HLS as it 
includes some explicit selection based on environmental benefit criteria – more specifically, 
farmers with the lowest agricultural OC have the greatest incentive to apply for the scheme 
(adverse selection), but because of the selection mechanism, only farmers providing higher 
environmental benefit are admitted into the scheme, thereby potentially reducing the adverse 
selection problem.  In addition, the operation of the HLS subject to a budget constraint on 
total payments to farmers may encourage the selection of ‘low cost’ farmers which, if they are 
providing similar environmental benefits to ‘high cost’ farmers, will improve the overall 
effectiveness of the Scheme.  Therefore, this paper focuses not just on the adverse selection 
problem arising from incentive incompatibility and asymmetries of information in the HLS 
tier of the Environmental Stewardship Scheme, but more importantly on the features of the 
HLS policy design that could decrease the potential for adverse selection, thereby improving 
the efficiency of the scheme. 
 
More specifically, HLS contracting is based on option self-selection by farmers from a 
nationally-set menu, a direct revelation mechanism potentially reducing the information 
asymmetry (Harris and Townsend, 1981, Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  Contract 
allocation based on a competitive scoring and a threshold mechanism (auction), in relation to 
limited public funding: farmers bid on the type and quantity of environmental service 
supplied (per individual option and in total) to meet the threshold, based on a quality score 
(against each Joint Character Area target met).  This choice of auction mechanism increases 
incentive compatibility by explicitly assessing applications on environmental features 
(scoring and threshold) and potentially reduces the information asymmetry by inducing 
truthful revealing of farmer OC (competition and uncertainty on threshold value).  The 
different weights of environmental targets met across Joint Character Areas for application 
scoring purposes, by spatially targeting local environmental priorities for application scoring, 
also potentially increase incentive compatibility.  The threshold (entry decision criterion or 
cut-off score) is regionally set after all applications have been made, depending on the 
regional quality of applications and available budget, and all applications above the threshold 
are retained for contracting.  Because of this scoring mechanism and varying threshold, 
Natural England is able to retain some bargaining power in agreement design, making Natural 
England advisers able to influence contract option selection.  The scoring and ‘moving’ 
regional threshold (higher if many high-score applications for a given round) mechanism has 
two main advantages for Natural England: it helps to discriminate between applications to 
allocate funding in relation to a budget constraint, and explicitly integrates (regional) 
environmental benefit criteria for entry into HLS (reduced incentive incompatibility from 
scoring). 
 
Most of the literature on adverse selection is based on contract design mechanisms to 
reduce incentive incompatibilities (Wu and Babcock, 1996, Moxey et al., 1999, Feng, 2007), 
but very few studies have actually empirically tested the extent of this information problem 
for agri-environmental contracts.  The HLS contract design is taken as given in this analysis, 
and instead the focus is placed on the HLS contract allocation mechanism.  This paper will in 
particular evaluate the potential for adverse selection reduction by explicit government 
selection for environmental benefits subject to a budget constraint on total payments to 
farmers.  The next section will thus develop a principal-agent model to assess the potential for 
adverse selection reduction in the HLS at the regional level (as compared to a spatially 
uniform national policy), followed by empirical evidence of whether adverse selection has 
been reduced.  The paper ends with a summary and conclusions. 
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2. Methodology 
The analysis is based on a theoretical principal-agent modelling of optimal farmer 
participation relative to the social optimum, in relation to land heterogeneity both within and 
between ‘regions’, as developed by Fraser (2009).  A principal-agent model is developed to 
analyse HLS contract allocation by the principal (Natural England), in relation to the potential 
effects of the adverse selection of farmers into the HLS, as well as the combination of policy 
mechanisms aimed at reducing adverse selection at the regional level.  The reference point for 
assessing adverse selection reduction will be taken as a nationally uniform scheme 
(nationally-uniform payment rate and environmental benefit per hectare).  The focus is placed 
only on those HLS options involving entering land into the scheme, as these most directly 
compete with agricultural production. 
 
Under this framework, farmers are profit-maximisers, which consequently leads to 
adverse selection by their selection of lower agricultural value land (with the highest returns 
to entering the scheme) for HLS entry.  The risk-neutral principal (Natural England) 
maximises social welfare – i.e. the expected environmental benefit (EB) across regions by 
assumption - subject to a budget constraint: 
                       () ∑ =
r
r r HLS q w EB
Q
. eb   E max
 ( 1) 
           subject to the budget constraint:  qi, j,rp j,r
i, j,r
∑ ≤ TotalBudget 
with  EBHLS  the total environmental benefit from HLS scheme allocation for 
government (Natural England); 
wr  the regional weight reflecting relative regional environmental values; 
eb  the environmental benefit per hectare entered into HLS, a decreasing 
function of qr (the function is assumed the same across regions); 
Q  the total quantity of environmental service over England (sum of qr for all 
regions r); 
qr  the quantity of environmental service in region r; 
qi,j,r  the quantity of environmental service for contract i, option j, and in region r; 
pr, j  the regional payment rate for option j in region r (national average foregone 
agricultural income adjusted for regional variations). 
It is assumed that eb is a decreasing function of the quantity of land offered for entry into 
HLS: the more hectares entered into HLS, the lower the environmental benefit per hectare.  
For modelling purposes, the environmental benefit per hectare eb is assumed the same over a 
given region and across regions, for a given quantity of land (i.e. the environmental benefit 
function is the same within and across regions), but the weighted environmental benefit per 
hectare for a given region (wr eb), varies across regions.  By construction, wr eb also is a 
decreasing function of the quantity of land entered into HLS. 
 
Under the stated assumptions and the budget constraint, the social-welfare (EB) 
maximising first-order condition under the budget constraint and after rearranging the terms: 
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From equation 2, the marginal net environmental benefit for the principal from the land 
entered into HLS (left hand-side) can be decomposed into the net benefit obtained by varying 
the payment rates regionally (first term on the right hand-side) plus the net benefit obtained 
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from the regional variation of environmental benefit per hectare (second term on the right 
hand-side).  The terms on the right-hand-side for equation 2 are equal to zero for a nationally 
uniform scheme (respectively nationally-uniform payment rates and environmental benefits 
per hectare).  The marginal net environmental benefit for the principal from the land entered 
into HLS for a spatially differentiated scheme consequently represents the efficiency gains 
from a reduction in adverse selection. 
 
Following equation 2, the principal’s objective function can be decomposed into 2 
parts: 
-  selection of Q by varying qr between regions for different regional payment rates 
pr, j for a given constant weighted environmental benefit per hectare (constant wr). 
-  selection of Q by varying the weighted environmental benefit per hectare between 
regions wr eb for a given constant payment rate (pr, j). 
 
Differentiating the welfare-maximising first order condition (equation 2) with respect to 
the regional payment rate pr, j for a given environmental benefit per hectare (wr constant 
across regions) leads to after rearranging: 
                       0 1

















 ( 3) 
From equation 3, the total quantity of land Q entered into the HLS maximising environmental 
benefit is such that, for each extra hectare of land entered into the scheme, the proportion of 
land entered in each region is equal to the opposite of the proportional change in payment 
rates for the region (given the same weighted environmental benefit per hectare).  This is 
equivalent to the following: 
Hypothesis 1: For the same given HLS budget (and equal regional weights), the 
quantity admitted into HLS will be greater in regions with lower payment rates 
(reflecting lower foregone agricultural incomes or agricultural values). 
This implies that, for the same environmental benefit derived from each hectare of land 
entered into the scheme (assuming equal regional weights), because more hectares can be 
contracted overall by contracting a higher land area in lower payment regions, for a given 
budget there is an overall associated higher total environmental benefit.  This would thus 
effectively reduce adverse selection between regions through the mechanism of the budget 
constraint. 
 
If one region displays a higher environmental benefit per hectare (i.e. the total 
willingness-to-pay per hectare is higher), the objective function can be adjusted to weight one 
region more highly (i.e. wr now varying across regions).  Differentiating the welfare-
maximising first order condition (equation 2) with respect to the weighted environmental 
benefit per hectare wr eb for given regional payment rates per option (pr, j constant across 
regions) leads to after rearranging:  
                         
∂ln(qr)
∂ln(wreb)
=1 > 0 ( 4) 
From equation 4, the total quantity of land Q entered into the HLS maximising environmental 
benefit is such that, for each extra hectare of land entered into the scheme, the proportion of 
land entered in each region is equal to the proportion of (weighted) environmental benefit per 
hectare for that region (constant payment rates).  This is equivalent to the following: 
Hypothesis 2: For differing regional weights, the quantity of land contracted will 
be higher in the regions with higher weighted environmental benefit for the same 
regional fixed payment rates per hectare (i.e. similar agricultural value). 
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This will imply that for the same budget, regions with a higher weighted environmental 
benefit per hectare are likely to display a higher rate of land admitted into the HLS.  This 
would effectively reduce adverse selection between regions, again through the mechanism of 
the budget constraint.  In this case the principal is expected to choose mainly farmers from the 
region with higher environmental benefit per hectare, thus achieving a higher total 
environmental benefit given the budget constraint. 
 
Landscape, wildlife (biodiversity), flood management, and access features are already 
explicitly included as environmental priorities in the JCA targeting statements.  In the 
empirical evaluation regional weights have been proxied by distances to some of the main 
cities (assumed inversely related to the environmental use value, Hanley et al., 2003, Bateman 
et al., 2006) in the principal’s objective function, implying that the principal allocates for a 
given budget proportionately more contracts in regions closer to cities (i.e. with a higher 
environmental benefit per hectare) than in regions with similar agricultural OC but further 
from cities. 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
From the above analysis, evidence that adverse selection is being reduced would be a 
statistically significant link between the number of hectares entered into HLS in one given 
region and the regional payment rates (hypothesis 1), and with the distance to the main cities 
(hypothesis 2). 
 
Contract data for all Environmental Stewardship tiers were provided by Natural 
England for 9 landscape regions in Yorkshire and the Humber, with some contract 
characteristics detailed at option-level and others at contract-level.  The quantity of land 
entered into the HLS per contract (qland) and total payment received per contract for the land 
entered into HLS were summed for each contract for all HLS options (aggregation per 
contract).  The average payment rate per contract was obtained by taking the ratio of the total 
payment received for all HLS options to the total quantity of land entered into HLS for each 
contract.  Mappy.co.uk was used to get for each contract the fastest travelling distances to 
Hull (most Eastern city), Leeds and Manchester (respectively most central and South-Western 
city) as two of the biggest conurbations in Northern England (Defra, 2000).  An average of 
these 3 distances was then calculated for each contract: by construction, the greater the 
average distance, the further away from the major East-West travelling link in the study area.  
The data used have been summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Variables description and statistics 
Variable Description  Units  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
qland  quantity of land entered into the 
HLS per contract 
ha 154  219 3  1,092
  total payment received per contract 
for the land entered into HLS 
£ 100,308  118,705 2,991  564,984
avepr  average payment rate per contract  £/ha 1,041  625 337  2,893
avedist  Average of fastest travelling 
distances to Hull Leeds and 
Manchester 
km 117 23 70  171
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Log-linear regressions were performed using Stata 9 (StataCorp, 2005), by regressing 
the quantity of land entered into HLS (qland) over the payment rate per contract (avepr) and 
the average distance to the three main cities (avedist).  HLS data are truncated as HLS 
successful entrants are mostly selected from a population of farmers enrolling into the 
(O)ELS part of the Environmental Stewardship Scheme.  A truncated and OLS regressions on 
the log-transformed variables for the given sample led to similar results, so the OLS results 
(log-linear model) only are reported in Table 2. 
 
Under a given budget constraint and controlling for the weighted environmental benefit 
per hectare (distance to cities here), the quantity of land entered is hypothesised to decrease 
for higher average payment rates (hypothesis 1).  A negative coefficient for the average 
payment rate per contract is consequently expected in the regression analysis.  With land 
closer to cities having a higher environmental value per hectare, for constant payment rates, 
the quantity of land entered is hypothesised to decrease as the distance from the main cities 
increases.  A negative coefficient for the average distance to main cities is thus expected in 
the regression analysis (hypothesis 2). 
Table 2: Log-linear regression results for estimating log(qland). 
(*: significant at a 10% level; **: significant at a 5% level; ***: significant at a 1% level of significance 
 Coefficients
avepr -2.001 ***
(standard error)  (0.296)   
avedist -2.494 ***
 (0.815)   
constant 29.546 ***
  (5.136)  
N  46  
R
2  0.52  
Adjusted R
2  0.49  
Breusch Pagan test 
(heteroskedasticity) 
Chi2 test statistic (1) 0.21  
P-value 0.65  
Durbin-Watson 
d-statistic(3, 46) 2.26  
P-value 0.65  
 
The adjusted R
2 value is relatively high (49%) for cross-sectional data, possibly because 
of the sample being drawn from the same area and presenting similar characteristics.  All 
coefficients display the expected negative signs, and both the coefficients for average 
payment rates and for the average distance to main cities were found significant at a 1% level 
of significance.  No heteroskedasticity was detected (Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test: 
Chi2 test statistic (1) = 0.21; p-value of 0.65).  First-order autoregressive errors ( AR(1) ) 
would be the most likely to arise for the spatially ordered data, but were not found statistically 
significant (Durbin-Watson d-statistic (3,46) of 2.26). 
 
As expected, the quantity of land entered significantly decreases as the payment rates 
increase (increasing foregone agricultural incomes).  Therefore, there is some evidence that, 
for a given environmental benefit per hectare, more land is enrolled into the HLS in lower 
payment regions under a given budget constraint (hypothesis 1).  For a given budget, given 
the same environmental benefit per hectare for all regions, more land overall will be entered 
   8
into the HLS across all regions from lower payment areas, resulting in a higher total 
environmental benefit from the scheme. 
 
Also as expected, the quantity of land entered is negatively related to the average 
distance to main cities, i.e. a decreasing quantity of land is entered for decreasing 
environmental value.  Therefore, there is some evidence that, for regions with the same 
payment rate (i.e. same agricultural land value) but varying environmental benefit weights 
(represented by distance to the main cities), more land is enrolled into the HLS from areas of 
higher environmental benefit (i.e. closer to the main cities) under a given budget constraint 
(hypothesis 2).  Given the distance to the main cities (capturing use value) is a good indicator 
of environmental value as assumed in this case, HLS contract allocation seems to reflect some 
allowance for differing environmental demand by region. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme, because of incentive incompatibility and 
asymmetric information, has a potential for adverse selection for the land entered into the 
scheme, leading to implementation inefficiencies.  However, the analysis in section 2 of this 
paper has hypothesized that adverse selection into its HLS component could be reduced by 
the explicit selection of contracts based on environmental benefit criteria embedded into the 
HLS policy design, and by the operation of a total payment budget constraint.  To evaluate 
these hypotheses the empirical research reported in section 3 focused on the impact of 
spatially differentiated payment rates (reflecting opportunity costs of entering HLS) and 
differences in weighted environmental benefit per hectare (inversely related to distances to 
main cities) as potentially reducing adverse selection when combined with a budget 
constraint. 
 
Differences in payment rates between two regions for a given total budget constraint 
were indeed found to be significantly negatively related to the amount of land admitted into 
the scheme for each landscape region.  This provides evidence that spatial differentiation of 
payment rates in combination with the budget constraint reduces adverse selection, and thus 
increases Scheme efficiency by increasing the overall amount of land entered into the 
Scheme, for a given environmental benefit per hectare.  In addition, differences in 
environmental benefit weights between regions (as measured by travelling distance to cities) 
for a given total budget constraint were also found to be significantly negatively related to the 
amount of land admitted into the scheme for each landscape region.  For landscape regions 
with the same payment rates (i.e. of the same agricultural value), differential weighting of the 
public demand for environmental goods and services provided by agriculture (measured by 
weighting an environmental benefit function by the distance to main cities) thus appears to be 




The authors would like to thank Natural England Agri-Environment Team for the 
provision of data on the agri-environmental schemes, without which this study would not 
have been possible. 
 
 
   9
References 
 
Bateman, I. J., et al. (2006). The aggregation of environmental benefit values: Welfare 
measures, distance decay and total WTP. Ecological economics, 60(2), 450-460. 
Defra (2000). Yorkshire and the Humber: Geographic Area and Physical Context.  
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Edition: 01/10/2000.  Last updated: 
17/08/2005. Available from: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/erdp/docs/yhchapter/yhsection11/default.htm [Accessed 
22/09/2008]. 
Defra (2005a). Environmental Stewardship: Look after your land and be rewarded. 
PB10487.Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Available from: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/erdp/schemes/es/default.htm [Accessed 06/07/2007]. 
Defra (2005b). Higher Level Stewardship handbook: Terms and conditions and how to apply. 
PB10382.Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Available from: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/erdp/pdfs/es/hls-handbook.pdf [Accessed 22/06/2007]. 
Feng, H. (2007). Green payments and dual policy goals. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 54(3), 323-335. 
Fraser, R. (2009). Land Heterogeneity, Agricultural Income Forgone and Environmental 
Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship 
Schemes. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 60(1), 190-201. 
Fraser, R. and I. Fraser (2006). The Implications of Information Asymmetries for Agri-
Environmental Policies. OECD Workshop on Information Deficiencies in Agri-environmental 
Policies, OECD Workshop on Information Deficiencies in Agri-environmental Policies, Paris, 
06/06/2006. 
Hanley, N., F. Schläpfer and J. Spurgeon (2003). Aggregating the benefits of environmental 
improvements: distance-decay functions for use and non-use values. Journal of environmental 
management, 68(3), 297-304. 
Harris, M. and R. M. Townsend (1981). Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information. 
Econometrica, 49(1), 33-64. 
Latacz-Lohmann, U. and S. Schilizzi (2005). Auctions for Conservation Contracts: A Review 
of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature. Project No: UKL/001/05. Available from: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/93853/0022574.pdf [Accessed 14/01/2008]. 
Mappy.co.uk.  Mappy SA. Available from: http://mappy.co.uk/ [Accessed 11/11/2008 & 
15/01/2009]. 
Moxey, A., B. White and A. Ozanne (1999). Efficient contract design for agri-environment 
policy. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50(2), 187-202. 
OECD (2004). Agriculture and the environment: lessons learned from a decade of OECD 
work. Available from: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/28/33913449.pdf [Accessed 
25/06/2007]. 




Wu, J. and B. A. Babcock (1996). Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods 
from Agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(4 ), 935-945. 
 
 